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The Quantum Private Query is a quantum cryptographic protocol to recover information from a
database, preserving both user and data privacy: the user can test whether someone has retained in-
formation on which query was asked, and the database provider can test the quantity of information
released. Here we introduce a new variant Quantum Private Query algorithm which admits a simple
linear optical implementation: it employs the photon’s momentum (or time slot) as address qubits
and its polarization as bus qubit. A proof-of-principle experimental realization is implemented.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Lx,03.67.Dd
Quantum information technology has matured espe-
cially in the field of cryptography. Two distant parties
can exploit quantum effects, such as entanglement, to
communicate in a provably secure fashion. An interest-
ing cryptographic primitive is the Symmetrically-Private
Information Retrieval (SPIR) [1]: it allows a user (say Al-
ice) to recover an element from a database in possession
of a provider (say Bob), without revealing which element
was recovered (user privacy). At the same time it allows
Bob to limit the total amount of information that Alice
receives (data privacy). Since user and data privacy ap-
pear to be conflicting requirements, all existing classical
protocols rely on constraining the resources accessible by
the two parties [2]. However, using quantum effects, such
constraints can be dropped: the Quantum Private Query
(QPQ) [3] is a quantum-cryptographic protocol that im-
plements a cheat-sensitive SPIR. User privacy is indi-
rectly enforced by allowing Alice to test the honesty of
Bob: she can perform a quantum test to find out whether
he is retaining any information on her queries, in which
case Bob would disturb the states Alice is transmitting
and she has some probability of detecting it [4]. Data
privacy is strictly enforced since the number of bits that
Alice and Bob exchange is too small to convey more than
at most two database items.
In this paper we present an optical scheme to carry out
a variant of the QPQ protocol. In contrast to the orig-
inal proposal of [3], it does not require a quantum ran-
dom access memory (qRAM) [5] and can be implemented
with linear optics, i.e. current technology, but it has
sub-optimal communication complexity. The qRAM’s
absence implies that the binary-to-unary translation to
route Alice’s query to the appropriate database memory
element must be performed by Alice herself. Thus Alice
and Bob must be connected by a number of communi-
cation channels equal to the number N of database ele-
ments (although O(logN) would suffice with a qRAM).
We present two conceptually equivalent QPQ implemen-
tations: in the first (more suited to explanatory purposes
and proof-of-principle tests) each channel is a spatial op-
tical mode, in the second (more suited to practical ap-
plications) it is a time slot in a fiber [6, 7]. The paper
focuses mostly on the former implementation for which
we provide an experimental test. For this setup we also
consider the case in which Alice entangles her queries
with ancillary systems that she keeps in her lab. With
this choice the user privacy can only be enhanced with
respect to original scheme [3] as Bob has only limited
access to the states which encode Alice’s queries.
We start with a description of the new scheme, focusing
on how user and data privacy can be tested. Then we
describe its experimental implementation, and conclude
with the time-slot implementation.
The scheme. The optical QPQ scheme is sketched
in Fig. 1(a). Bob controls an N -element database, where
each element j is associated to a spatial optical mode
and consists of one bit Aj of classical information. The
bit Aj = 1 (0) is encoded into the presence (absence)
of a half-wave plate Bpr in the jth mode (it rotates the
polarization by 90◦). Alice probes this system with sin-
gle photons either in one mode or in a superposition of
modes. To recover the database element Aj , Alice sends
to Bob a single horizontally polarized photon H in the
mode j, i.e. the state |Pj〉 = |H〉j– see Fig. 1(b). Bob
employs the photon’s polarization as a “bus” qubit to
communicate the query result: vertical V if Aj = 1, or
horizontal H if Aj = 0. Namely, his transformation is
|Pj〉 → |P outj 〉 = |Aj〉j ≡
{|H〉j for Aj = 0
|V 〉j for Aj = 1 . (1)
This exchange is clearly not private. To attain cheat
sensitivity, Alice must randomly alternate two different
kinds of queries: “plain” queries of the type |Pj〉 de-
scribed above and “superposed” queries
|Sj〉 = (|H〉j |∅〉ja + |∅〉j |H〉ja)/
√
2 , (2)
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FIG. 1: a) Overview of the experiment. Alice at the query-
preparation stage routes a single photon to the appropriate
spatial modes, where Bob’s database are stored in an array of
polarization rotators Bpr. b) Alice’s query preparation stage.
A set of half-wave plates and polarizing beam splitters route
the photon into the spatial mode j chosen by Alice. She also
chooses whether to send a “superposed” query (see c) or a
“plain” query (see d). c) If she chose a superimposed query
|Sj〉, Alice performs the honesty test through an interference
experiment in the j-th mode. d) Instead, if she chose a plain
query |Pj〉, she performs a polarization measurement on the
photon to recover the value of Aj .
where the j-th mode is entangled with an ancillary spa-
tial mode ja, and where |∅〉 is the vacuum state. Ac-
cording to original proposal [3] ja should be identified
with one (say the first) of the N spatial modes of the
system, whose associated database entry is initialized in
a known fiduciary value Aja = 0. With this choice ja will
play the role of the rhetoric query of the original QPQ
scheme whose user privacy has been formally proved in
Ref. [4]. Here however we follow an alternative strategy
which guarantees user privacy levels which are at least
as good as the original scheme and which can be easily
realized in the spatial mode implementation. Namely, as
shown in Fig. 1(a), the ja’s will be identified with ex-
tra modes that Alice keeps in her lab. With this choice
Alice privacy can only increase with respect to the origi-
nal scheme as Bob does not have access to the complete
quantum system (2) — his cheating operations can only
act on the subsystem that Alice has sent him while the
QPQ security proof [4] assumes he can act on the full
state system. To prepare such input state Alice simply
shines an H polarized photon onto a 50% beam-splitter
sending one of the emerging beams to Bob and keeping
the other in her lab as shown in Fig. 1(c). After hav-
ing crossed Bob’s lab (in the absence of cheating), the
superposed query is evolved into
|Sj〉 → |Soutj 〉 = (|Aj〉j |∅〉ja + |∅〉j |H〉ja)/
√
2 . (3)
The two types of queries |Pj〉 and |Sj〉 must be submitted
in random order and one at a time (i.e. she must wait for
Bob’s first reply before sending him the second query):
if Bob received both queries at the same time, he could
cheat undetected with a joint measurement [3].
The random alternation of plain and superposed
queries allows Alice to test Bob’s honesty. Indeed, since
he does not know whether her photon is in the state |Pj〉
or |Sj〉, if Bob measures its position he risks collapsing
the superposed query |Sj〉, and Alice can easily find it
out. In fact, she can first obtain the value of Aj through
a polarization readout from |P outj 〉 – see Fig. 1(d). She
can then use this value to prepare a projective measure-
ment that tests whether the superposed query |Sj〉 has
been preserved or collapsed (honesty test), i.e. a mea-
surement that tests if the answer associated with |Sj〉
has been collapsed into the subspace orthogonal to the
expected output |Soutj 〉. [As explained in more detail in
the next section, this essentially amounts to the inter-
ferometric measurement of Fig. 1(c).] If this happened,
she can confidently conclude that Bob has cheated. If this
has not happened she cannot conclude anything: a cheat-
ing Bob still has some probability of passing the test. For
instance, assume that Bob uses a measure-and-reprepare
strategy on one of the two queries, he will be caught
only with probability 1/4. Anyhow, whatever cheating
strategy Bob may employ, the probability of passing the
honesty test is bounded by the information he retains on
Alice’s query [4]: he can pass the test with certainty if
and only if he does not retain any information from her.
Readout and honesty test. Before proceeding, we
analyze in more detail Alice’s measurements. Consider
first the case in which Alice first sends the plain query
|Pj〉 and then the superposed query |Sj〉. In this case,
she recovers Aj with the polarization measurement of
Fig. 1(d). Then, before sending the second query |Sj〉,
she sets up an interferometer which couples the ancil-
lary mode ja with the output of the mode j as shown
in Fig.1(c), where the polarization rotator Apr is used
to compensate the rotation induced by Bob’s database,
determined by the value of Aj that she previously recov-
ered. Therefore, if Bob has not cheated, the state in the
interferometer just before the second beam splitter is |Sj〉
so that the “don’t know” detector D0 must fire and the
“cheat” detector D1 cannot fire. If the “cheat” detector
D1 does fire, Alice knows that Bob must have cheated.
Consider now the case in which Alice sends first the
superposed query |Sj〉 and then the plain query |Pj〉. In
order to perform the honesty test, she must first recover
the value of Aj . So she needs to store the answer to
the superposed query |Soutj 〉 until the answer to the plain
query |P outj 〉 arrives, from which Aj can be measured. It
requires a quantum memory [8] and a fast feed-forward
mechanism [9] to prepare the honesty test measurement
depending on the value of Aj . Achieving this is possi-
ble, but demanding. The same goal is reached with a
less efficient but much simpler strategy. Alice chooses a
random value A(R) in place of Aj . She then performs
the interferometric measurement of Fig. 1(c) inserting or
3not the polarization rotator Apr depending on the value
of A(R). This interferometer is then a projector on the
state |S(guess)j 〉 ≡ (|A(R)〉j |∅〉ja + |∅〉j |H〉ja)/
√
2. Later,
when she receives the output of the plain query |P outj 〉,
she finds out the value of Aj . If she had picked the right
value A(R) = Aj , she will know that her first measure-
ment was a valid honesty test since |Soutj 〉 = |S(guess)j 〉.
Otherwise, if A(R) 6= Aj , then the result of her honesty
test is useless and she must discard it. Since Alice chooses
A(R) = Aj with probability 1/2, she performs the hon-
esty test only on half of the transactions. This reduces
her probability of discovering a cheating Bob, but not by
a huge amount. For instance, in the example analyzed
above, the probability is reduced from 1/4 to 3/16. As
before, Bob passes the honesty test with probability 1 if
and only if he does not cheat.
Let us now briefly summarize the protocol. 1) Alice
randomly chooses one of the two scenarios: either send
first the plain query |Pj〉 and then the superposed query
|Sj〉, or viceversa. 2a) In the first case, she recovers Aj
from Bob’s first reply and uses it to prepare the honesty
test to use on his second reply. 2b) In the second case, she
chooses a random bit A(R) and prepares the honesty test
using it in place of Aj . Then she performs the honesty
test on Bob’s first reply. When Aj becomes available
later (from Bob’s second reply), she finds out whether
the honesty test result was meaningful (if Aj = A
(R)) or
not (if Aj 6= A(R)). 3) If the honesty test was meaningful
and it has failed, she can conclude that Bob has cheated.
Data privacy. In the original QPQ protocol [3], data
privacy was ensured by the fact that only a limited num-
ber of qubits were exchanged between Alice and Bob:
she had to send (and receive) a sequence of O(logN)
qubits to specify the address of the j th element. In
contrast, in this version of the protocol Alice has direct
access to all the entries of Bob’s database through the
N optical modes. She can then violate data privacy and
recover multiple elements of Bob’s database by sending
many photons, one per mode. Theoretically, Bob can foil
Alice by performing a joint measurement on theN spatial
modes that discriminates the subspace with zero or one
photon from the rest. If he finds that the modes jointly
contain more than one photon, he knows that Alice is
trying to violate the data privacy, and stops the commu-
nication. If, instead, he finds that Alice is sending no
more than one photon per query, he can be sure that she
is recovering no more than one bit per transaction.
Unfortunately, the above measurement is practically
unfeasible. An alternative solution which is feasible, al-
though less efficient, is the following. After Alice has
sent her first photon into his lab, Bob blocks the ac-
cess to the database and partitions it into X equal parts
P1, P2, · · · , PX containing N/X random entries each. He
then communicates to Alice the composition of the parti-
tions asking to reveal log2 X bits on her query to indicate
which of the Pℓ’s contains the database entry she is in-
terested in (the fact that Alice has to reveal some bits
should not be seen as a breach of the user privacy, since
this is a (small) fixed quantity which is independent on
the database size). Bob now can perform a local pho-
todetection on each of the modes of the X − 1 partitions
which according to Alice do not contain the message she
is looking for. If he finds any photons there, he knows for
sure that Alice has cheated and stops the communication.
If he does not, he cannot conclude that Alice has cheated
and allows her to complete her query sending the second
photon, for which the above procedure is repeated.
As in the case of user privacy, the data privacy is thus
enforced by means of a probabilistic, non conclusive hon-
esty test. In particular there is a tradeoff: the more bits
Alice reveals on her query, the higher is the probabil-
ity that Bob will be able to find out if she is cheating.
For instance, consider the case in which Alice tries to re-
cover some extra bits from the database by sending t > 1
photons per transmitted signal. Assuming random en-
codings, the probability that all of them will be found
in the same subset of the database partition can be es-
timated as X(1/X)t = (1/X)t−1. This is the only case
in which Alice can safely pass Bob’s honesty test. In all
remaining cases at least one of the t photons will belong
to one of the subsets on which Bob performs his pho-
todetections. Alice’s probability of being caught is thus
equal to P = 1−(1/X)t−1, which increases both with the
number (t− 1) of cheating photons and with the number
log2 X of bits she reveals to Bob – see Fig. 2. The gating
is also fundamental: Bob must open the access to the
database only during the transit time of Alice’s photons,
prompted by a trigger signal. Otherwise, she can cheat
sending photons at other times. Similar expedients are
usually adopted in plug-&-play cryptographic schemes to
avoid Trojan horse attacks [10]. These parts of the pro-
tocol are important only if data privacy is an issue. As
done in the experiment below, it can be omitted when
only user privacy is important.
Experimental results. In order to perform a proof-
of-principle experiment, we have to show that Alice can
recover the value of each database element, and that she
can detect Bob’s cheats. The single photon is created
by starting from a biphoton generated through sponta-
neous parametric downconversion and using one of the
two component photons as a trigger. A sequence of half-
wave plates and polarizing beam splitters allows Alice to
choose the mode j (i.e. the database element) she wants
to access with her H polarized photon – see Fig. 1(b). In
the experiment we employed N = 3 modes. A standard
polarization analysis setup and single photon detectors
implement the reading process of Fig. 1(d) performed by
Alice. In Table I-(a) we report the experimental results
for the preparation and measurement of each query |Pj〉
(j = 1, · · · , 3), giving the outcome fidelity for each ele-
ment in the database.
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FIG. 2: Left: Experimental fidelity values (dots) for different
time delays introduced in the interferometer, which simulate
the effects of different cheating attacks by Bob (large values of
the temporal delay correspond to larger disturbances, i.e. to a
larger information capture by Bob). The upper curve is the fit
for the probability that Alice’s “don’t know” detector D0 fires
during the honesty test, the lower curve refers to probability
that Alice’s “cheat” detector D1 fires. The fit function is
Gaussian due to the spectral and temporal profile of the single
photon state. Right: Theoretical curve representing the data
privacy P = 1 − (1/X)t−1 as a function of the bits log
2
X
Alice reveals to Bob and of the photons t she uses to cheat.
The characterization of the honesty test follows. Alice
must be able to move the interferometer of Fig. 1(c) to
the mode j corresponding to the question she wants to
ask. We have implemented this using a Jamin-Lebedeff
interferometer, which is quite compact, easy movable,
and leads to a high phase stability [11]. In the first part
of Table I-(b) we characterize Alice’s honesty test when
Bob is not cheating. To cheat, Bob may introduce a
beam splitter in each mode and place a detector at the
beam splitter output port. When he detects a photon
in a mode j, he recreates a photon there. To simulate
this cheating attack, we introduced a variable time delay
in each mode. A delay larger than the photon’s coher-
j Aj Fidelity Aj Fidelity
1 0 (99.84 ± 0.04)% 1 (99.99± 0.01)%
2 0 (99.81 ± 0.04)% 1 (99.72± 0.05)%
3 0 (99.99 ± 0.01)% 1 (99.99± 0.01)%
Aj D0 th. D0 exp. D1 th. D1 exp.
No cheat 0 1 (99.3 ± 0.2)% 0 (0.7 ± 0.2)%
No cheat 1 1 (99.4 ± 0.2)% 0 (0.6 ± 0.2)%
Cheat 0 0.5 (45.0 ± 0.1)% 0.5 (55.0± 0.1)%
Cheat 1 0.5 (45.4 ± 0.1)% 0.5 (54.6± 0.1)%
TABLE I: (a) Experimental values of the fidelity of Alice’s
measurement of each of the three elements of Bob’s database.
The measurement is performed by sending queries of the form
|Pj〉, and measuring the output polarization— see Fig. 1(d).
(b) Comparison between theoretical (th.) and experimen-
tal (exp.) fidelities of Alice’s honesty test of Fig. 1(c). The
discrepancy with theory is due to unbalancement of the inter-
ferometer and slight misalignment.
ence length simulates a “measure-and-reprepare” cheat
(i.e. zero beam splitter transmissivity). Shorter delays
simulate a milder cheat (i.e. nonzero beam splitter trans-
missivities). This was implemented by inserting quartz
plates of varying thickness in Bob’s arm of the interfer-
ometer. In Table I-(b) and in Fig. 2 Alice’s honesty test
is characterized also in the presence of cheating.
Time-slot implementation. We now describe a dif-
ferent implementation of the scheme, based on [6, 7]. To
each database element j we associate a unique time slot
in an optical fiber: Alice places her query photon in the
jth slot (i.e. the state |Pj〉) if she wants to access Aj .
Bob’s database is encoded into a time dependent polar-
ization rotator: in the jth time slot the polarization is
rotated only if Aj = 1. To create the superposed |Sj〉
query, Alice places her photon in a superposition of two
time slots [6]. This is achieved by sending it through
a 50% beam splitter, at the two outputs of which she
places a long and a short fiber. The length difference of
the fibers corresponds to a delay proportional to j. The
signals from the two fibers are then joined into a sin-
gle fiber through an optical switch [6]. The same device
(used in reverse) is used as cheat test on the superposed
signal returning from Bob: the optical switch sends the
first pulse through the long fiber and the second through
the short fiber, so that they interfere at the beam split-
ter. The photon then exits at one of the two “cheat” or
“don’t know” ports of the beam splitter. It is simple to
see that this implementation is conceptually equivalent
to the previous one, but it is more suited to the case in
which Alice and Bob are far apart, as this procedure has
been tested experimentally with interferometers of many
Km in length [7, 10]. Our protocol can be easily scaled
up considerably since the resources scale only linearly
with the number of database elements. The number of
database elements is ultimately limited only by the time-
dependent noise the photons encounter along the fiber.
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